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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

HYPOTHESIZING A SMALL OPIOID MDL SETTLEMENT: AN
ARGUMENT FOR LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION AND
LESSONS FROM BIG TOBACCO
ABSTRACT
In response to the opioid epidemic, counties and cities across the United
States waged In re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, better known as the
opioid MDL, against manufacturers and distributors of opioids. The county and
city plaintiffs appear to have taken their litigation strategy straight from Big
Tobacco playbook of the 1990s. This is to the great disdain of state attorneys
general, who fronted Big Tobacco litigation with state-sponsored parens patriae
litigation.
The state attorneys general vehemently assert that the MDL claims are the
province of state governments rather than local governments. However, the
attorney general-led Big Tobacco litigation of the 1990s left much to be desired.
While the states were able to procure a $206 billion tobacco Master Settlement
Agreement in 1998, a seemingly enormous win for tobacco victims, the state
attorneys general allocated a devastatingly low amount of the proceeds to the
intended purposes of smoking cessation programs and public health initiatives.
Just like Big Tobacco litigation, a global opioid settlement purported to resolve
the MDL claims seems inevitable—and states are eager to undermine local
efforts in reaching a settlement.
This Note argues that state attorneys general should not be permitted to
overthrow settlement negotiations in the county-and-city-led opioid MDL,
positioning that counties and cities are better suited than states to implement
evidence-based public health initiates in their own communities. Spending
shortfalls of the Master Settlement Agreement demonstrate precisely why
allocating settlement money to the states guarantees little to no spending
accountability. This Note further identifies three reasons why, despite many
similarities in the litigation tactics between tobacco and opioids, a global opioid
settlement agreement will be far smaller than the $206 billion tobacco Master
Settlement Agreement of 1998. Therefore, a smaller settlement would be best
utilized by apportioning settlement proceeds directly to the local governments,
which are the most impacted by the opioid epidemic.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What’s happening in our country with the opioid crisis is present and ongoing. I
did a little math. Since we’re losing more than 50,000 of our citizens every year,
about 150 Americans are going to die today, just today, while we’re meeting.
And in my humble opinion, everyone shares some of the responsibility, and no
one has done enough to abate it. That includes the manufacturers . . . the doctors,
the federal government and state government, local hospitals, third-party payors,
and individuals. . . . So my objective is to do something meaningful to abate the
crisis and to do it in 2018. 1

On December 12, 2017, the panel for multidistrict litigation created In re:
National Prescription Opiate Litigation (the opioid MDL) by transferring sixtyfour personal injury cases against opioid manufacturers and distributors to Judge
Dan Polster in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.2
These consolidated cases turn on theories that (1) opioid manufacturers, namely
Purdue Pharma, the manufacturer of OxyContin, misrepresented the addictive
nature of long-term opioid use for persons with chronic pain, and (2) opioid
distributors failed to adequately monitor suspicious orders of opioids. 3 By
September 2019, the opioid MDL had expanded to include over 2,500 individual
lawsuits filed by United States counties and cities against manufacturers,
distributors, and pharmacies. 4
Judge Polster’s goal is for the parties to reach an effective settlement
agreement, and he wanted to do it back in 2018. 5 As Judge Polster informed all
parties in the opioid MDL, “What [going to trial] will accomplish, I don’t know.
But I’d rather not do that.” 6 “People aren’t interested in depositions, and
discovery, and trials.” 7 Judge Polster is disinterested in allowing procedural
hockey to play out in his chambers, as early case management orders clarified
that trial would not be moved because of procedural delay. 8 Moreover, in all
1. Transcript of Proceedings at 4:1-12, 4:24-25, In re: National Prescription Opiate
Litigation, No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (Jan. 9, 2018) (No. 58) [hereinafter MDL No. 2804]. On
January 9, 2018, Judge Dan Polster addressed all parties and strongly suggested that with all of
these “smart people here and their clients,” he was confident the parties could abate the opioid
epidemic through effective negotiation tactics. Id. at 5:3-6.
2. Transfer Order at 1, 3, MDL No. 2804 (Dec. 12, 2017) (No. 1).
3. See generally, e.g., MDL 2804: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, U.S. DISTRICT
CT. FOR NORTHERN DISTRICT OHIO, https://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/mdl-2804 (last visited Apr.
11, 2020).
4. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class at 1–2, 12, MDL No. 2804 (Sept. 11,
2019) (No. 2590).
5. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 4:24-25, 6:12-13.
6. Id. at 6:9-10.
7. Id. at 4:19-20.
8. Case Management Order No. 1 at 17, MDL No. 2804 (Apr. 11, 2018) (No. 232) (stating
the granting of an extension of discovery “shall not change the trial date, and the Court does not
intend to move the trial date of the Track One case(s).”) (emphasis omitted). However, trial was
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cases, Judge Polster ordered both plaintiff and defense counsel to select six
attorneys to represent their respective clients in negotiations. 9 The push for
settlement reached new heights on September 11, 2019, when Judge Polster
certified a first-of-its-kind “Negotiation Class” under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 as a means of encouraging a global settlement between a class of
forty-nine plaintiff representatives and thirteen defendants on behalf of every
county and city in the United States. 10
The push for settlement appears to be working. On September 15, 2019, just
four days after certification of the Negotiation Class, Purdue Pharma announced
its proposed settlement agreement in the opioid MDL. 11 The terms of the
settlement included a filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the Sackler family
relinquishing control of the company, and the company agreeing to pay out a
minimum of $3 billion to plaintiffs over the next seven years. 12 Then, on October
20, 2019, the eve of the first trial set in the opioid MDL, four companies—Teva,
Cardinal Health, AmerisourceBergen, and McKesson—settled with both Track
One bellwether plaintiffs Summit and Cuyahoga Counties in Ohio for $260
million. 13 Yet another opioid manufacturer proposed settlement in February
2020, when Mallinckrodt PLC announced it was finalizing a settlement proposal
worth at least $1.6 billion and which included a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. 14
Between Judge Polster’s push for global settlement and companies settling
along the way, a global settlement purported to resolve all pending cases seems
inevitable. The logical comparison may be with Big Tobacco litigation of the
1990s, which culminated with the Master Settlement Agreement of 1998, the

nonetheless postponed to October 21, 2019, and the original three-week trial now stands at eight
weeks, with closing arguments set for December 13, 2019. Case Management Order No. 8 at 1–2,
MDL No. 2804 (Jan. 29, 2019) (No. 1306); Civil Jury Trial Order at 3, MDL No. 2804 (May 1,
2019) (No. 1598).
9. Minutes of 1/31/18 Settlement Conference & Scheduling Order at 1–2, MDL No. 2804
(Feb. 2, 2018) (No. 111).
10. Order Certifying Negotiation Class & Approving Notice at 3, MDL No. 2804 (Sept. 11,
2019) (No. 2591).
11. Restructure: Purdue Pharma Announces Agreement in Principle on Landmark Opioid
Litigation Settlement, PURDUE PHARMA (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.purduepharma.com/
restructure/.
12. Jan Hoffman & Mary Williams Walsh, Purdue Pharma, Maker of OxyContin, Files for
Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/15/health/purduepharma-bankruptcy-opioids-settlement.html.
13. Opioid MDL Track One Cases Settle on Eve of Openings, Joe Rice Leads Negotiations,
MOTLEY RICE LLC (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.motleyrice.com/article/opioid-mdl-track-onesettlement.
14. Alexander Gladstone et al., Mallinckrodt Pitches at Least $1.6 Billion Opioid Settlement,
Generics Unit Bankruptcy, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
mallinckrodt-enters-creditor-talks-ahead-of-potential-generics-bankruptcy-11582572100.
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largest civil settlement in United States history that resulted in a $206 billion
award for state attorney general plaintiffs. 15
One striking difference in the opioid MDL, however, is the significant role
of county and city plaintiffs. This is to the great disdain of nearly forty state
attorneys general, many of whom are pursuing their own state-level claims, who
fervently assert the claims of the MDL are the province of the states and not the
local governments. 16 Judge Polster has found that if the attorneys general believe
they in fact control jurisdiction, then those attorneys general could attempt to
foreclose the claims directly. 17 Yet no attorneys general have attempted to shut
down the local governments’ cases. 18 Judge Polster asserts that until that
happens, he cannot “pretend” that the more than 2,000 separate actions filed by
counties and cities simply do not exist in his courtroom. 19
This Note argues that state attorneys general should not be permitted to
overthrow settlement negotiations in the county-and-city-led opioid MDL,
positing that counties and cities are better suited than states to implement
evidence-based public health initiates in their own communities. Spending
shortfalls of the Master Settlement Agreement demonstrate precisely why
allocating settlement money to the states guarantees little to no accountability.
Moreover, this Note identifies three reasons why, despite many similarities in
the litigation tactics between tobacco and opioids, a global opioid settlement
agreement will be far smaller than the $206 billion tobacco Master Settlement
Agreement of 1998. Therefore, a smaller settlement would be best utilized by
apportioning settlement proceeds directly to the local governments, which are
the most directly impacted by the opioid epidemic.
Part II discusses the background of tobacco litigation and opioid litigation.
Part III identifies three reasons why a global opioid MDL settlement will be far
smaller than the $206 billion tobacco Master Settlement Agreement of 1998.
Part IV argues why counties and cities are better suited than states to implement
community-based public health initiatives, and it discusses examples of local
public health initiatives that have proven successful. Finally, Part V concludes
this Note, further reiterating that state attorneys general should not appropriate
MDL negotiations.

15. See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
(1998); Barry Meier, Cigarette Makers and States Draft a $206 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
14, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/14/us/cigarette-makers-and-states-draft-a-206-bil
lion-deal.html.
16. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 4, at 31.
17. Id. at 31–32.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 32.
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II. BACKGROUND OF TOBACCO LITIGATION AND OPIOID LITIGATION
A.

History of Tobacco Litigation

In the early 1990s, the tobacco industry boasted an almost half-century
record of having never paid a dime to a single plaintiff who brought suit against
it. 20 Big Tobacco’s litigation strategy was aggressive and straightforward: refuse
to settle a single case. 21 The industry relied largely on its ability to “wear down”
plaintiffs in the pretrial process through intimidation and delay. 22 The tobacco
industry vigorously denied the claim that smoking causes cancer, which required
plaintiffs’ counsel, generally paid on contingency fee bases, to bear heavy frontloaded costs in retaining experts to rebut the tobacco companies’ experts. 23 Big
Tobacco teamed up with big law firms to argue endless pretrial motions, take up
procedural challenges, and take depositions until most plaintiffs were forced to
drop their cases before the claims could even make it to trial. 24
That all changed in 1994. That year, Mississippi Attorney General Mike
Moore joined with plaintiff’s attorneys to file an unprecedented parens patriae 25
suit on behalf of Mississippi citizens for Medicaid-related expenses arising out
of smoking-related illnesses. 26 In the following years, forty other state attorneys
general followed suit. 27 These cases sought equitable relief under claims of

20. See Lynn Mather, Theorizing About Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and Tobacco
Litigation, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 897, 904–05 (1998). From the 1950s to 1995, smokers and their
families filed over 700 product liability suits against the tobacco industry. Id. Only one case,
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208, 210 (D.N.J. 1988), resulted in a jury award for
the plaintiffs. Id. at 905; On appeal, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 583 (3d Cir.
1990), the Third Circuit overturned the $400,000 jury award, thus preserving the industry’s perfect
record of having never paid any money to a single plaintiff. Id.
21. Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV.
853, 857–58 (1992).
22. Michael C. Moore & Charles J. Mikhail, A New Attack on Smoking Using an Old-Time
Remedy, 111 PUB. HEALTH REP. 192, 194 (1996).
23. Rabin, supra note 21, at 858.
24. Id. at 859.
25. Parens patriae literally means “parent of the country.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico, ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982). To invoke a parens patriae suit, a “State must
be more than a nominal party,” meaning it cannot merely express the interests of particular private
parties. Id. at 607. A State must express a “quasi-sovereign interest.” Id. Quasi-sovereign interests
fall into two general categories: (1) an “interest in the health and well-being—both physical and
economic—of its residents in general;” or (2) an interest in “not being discriminatorily denied its
rightful status within the federal system.” Id. Similarly, in tobacco litigation, states were able to
demonstrate their interests in the health and well-being of its residents. See id. at 609.
26. Complaint at 1–2, Moore ex rel. Mississippi v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss.
Ch. Ct. 1994); Michael McCann et al., Criminalizing Big Tobacco: Legal Mobilization and the
Politics of Responsibility for Health Risks in the United States, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 288, 294
(2013).
27. McCann et al., supra note 26, at 294.
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restitution, unjust enrichment, and injunction rather than seeking to obtain
damages for injuries suffered by the individual smoker. 28 Other claims utilized
by plaintiffs included conspiracy, fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation, and
RICO. 29 Underpinning the conspiracy claims were theories that the tobacco
industry had manipulated nicotine levels in cigarettes in order to sustain
consumer addiction, as well as that the industry knew of the dangers of tobacco
use but marketed cigarettes anyway. 30 In 1997, four states (Mississippi,
Minnesota, Florida, and Texas) were able to settle for $40 billion with the
tobacco industry for costs arising out of Medicaid-related causes of action. 31 The
following year, the remaining forty-six states obtained a $206 billion Master
Settlement Agreement with the tobacco industry, the largest civil settlement in
U.S. history, that was to be paid out to the states over the next twenty-five
years. 32
B.

Shortfalls of the Master Settlement Agreement

Such a groundbreaking tobacco settlement, however, left much to be
desired. While the tobacco plaintiffs were able to obtain a $246 billion total
award that was supposed to be used for smoking cessation campaigns and public
health initiatives, only a small portion of that money has actually been used for
its intended purpose. 33 For example, the Government Accountability Office
found that between fiscal years 2000 and 2005, when states received a total of
$52.6 billion in tobacco settlement payments, states used only 3.5% of the
proceeds for tobacco control and 30% on health care (which included spending
for programs like Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program), 34 but
they used 22.9% for budget shortfalls, 6% on “infrastructure,” 7.1% for “general
purposes,” 7.8% on “other,” and 11.9% was unallocated. 35 In 2014, New York
used $700,000 of the tobacco funds for a sprinkler system on a public golf
course, and regrettably, North Carolina gave $42 million to tobacco farmers for

28. Moore & Mikhail, supra note 22, at 197.
29. Cliff Sherrill, Tobacco Litigation: Medicaid Third Party Liability and Claims for
Restitution, 19 UALR L.J. 497, 506 (1997).
30. Id. at 507.
31. See also TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, THE MASTER SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2015); Mather, supra note 20, at 898.
32. See generally NAT’L ASSOC. OF ATTORNEYS GEN., MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
(1998); Meier, supra note 15.
33. TOBACCO FREE KIDS, BROKEN PROMISES TO OUR CHILDREN: A STATE-BY-STATE LOOK
AT THE 1998 STATE TOBACCO SETTLEMENT 19 YEARS LATER 1, 139 (2017).
34. Nicholas Terry & Aila Hoss, Opioid Litigation Proceeds: Cautionary Tales from the
Tobacco Settlement, HEALTH AFF. (May 23, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/h
blog20180517.992650/full/.
35. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TOBACCO SETTLEMENT: STATES’ ALLOCATIONS
OF PAYMENTS FROM TOBACCO COMPANIES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2005 2, 7 (2007).
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“modernization and marketing.” 36 In 2018, states were estimated to have spent
less than three cents of every dollar in tobacco settlement revenue to actually
help prevent tobacco use. 37
As of Fiscal Year 2019, total payments to the states from the 1998 Master
Settlement Agreement amassed $156.7 billion. 38 During those twenty years
since the settlement, states spent just 2.6% of it on tobacco prevention and
cessation programs. 39 Currently, not a single state uses settlement funds for
tobacco prevention programs at the CDC-recommended level. 40 For Fiscal Year
2019, the CDC-recommended level was a mere $3.3 billion out of the $27.3
billion that states received in settlement proceeds and tobacco taxes. 41
Meanwhile, tobacco companies currently spend $9.1 billion a year—“$1 million
every hour”—on marketing and advertising for their products. 42
C. Today’s Opioid MDL and a Brief History of Opioid Litigation
Over twenty years after the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, Mike
Moore is at it again, and he’s using litigation tactics straight out of the Big
Tobacco playbook. 43 Like he did in the 1990s, Moore traveled across the country
hoping to recruit state attorneys general and plaintiffs’ firms to his pursuit
against the pharmaceutical industry. 44 That pursuit culminated with the
launching of the opioid MDL on December 12, 2017, when the panel for
multidistrict litigation consolidated sixty-four opioid personal injury cases and
assigned them to Judge Dan Polster in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio. 45 By August 2018, the opioid MDL had amassed
more than 1,000 opioid-related lawsuits from over forty states against
pharmaceutical giants such as Purdue Pharma, Mallinckrodt, and Endo

36. Jim Estes, How the Big Tobacco Deal Went Bad, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/07/opinion/how-the-big-tobacco-deal-went-bad.html.
37. TOBACCO FREE KIDS, BROKEN PROMISES TO OUR CHILDREN: A STATE-BY-STATE LOOK
AT THE 1998 STATE TOBACCO SETTLEMENT 20 YEARS LATER 1 (2018).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. Broken Promises to Our Children: A State-by-State Look at the 1998 State Tobacco
Settlement 21 Years Later, TOBACCO FREE KIDS (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org
/what-we-do/us/statereport.
43. Esmé E. Deprez & Paul Barrett, The Lawyer Who Beat Big Tobacco Takes on the Opioid
Industry, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/
2017-10-05/the-lawyer-who-beat-big-tobacco-takes-on-the-opioid-industry.
44. Id.
45. Transfer Order, supra note 2, at 3.
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Pharmaceuticals. 46 Only a year later, the opioid MDL stood to include well over
2,000 individual lawsuits. 47
Plaintiffs in the opioid MDL, most of whom are United States counties or
cities, allege that (1) the manufacturers of prescription opioids misrepresented
to physicians the risks of long-term opioid use for patients with chronic pain,
and (2) the distributors failed to adequately monitor, investigate, and detect
suspicious orders of prescription opioids, all of which contributed to the current
opioid epidemic. 48 Like in tobacco litigation, causes of action in the opioid MDL
include fraudulent concealment, RICO, civil conspiracy, negligence, various
criminal acts, and unjust enrichment. 49
The opioid lawsuits began, however, far before the inception of the opioid
MDL. Perhaps taking a lesson from Big Tobacco, early opioid plaintiffs
prevailed against pharmaceutical companies in a number of multimillion-dollar
settlements, and it is precisely because they initiated their lawsuits with
government action. For example, in November 2004, Purdue Pharma, the
manufacturer of OxyContin, reached a $10 million settlement with West
Virginia after the state’s attorney general accused the company of aggressively
marketing OxyContin and causing widespread addiction in the state. 50 In May
2007, Purdue pled guilty to criminal misbranding and agreed to pay $600 million
in fines, in addition to paying at least $130 million to help resolve civil suits
arising out of addiction claims. 51 In 2015, Kentucky Attorney General Jack
Conway settled a lawsuit with Purdue for $24 million, 52 and New York Attorney
General Eric Schneiderman secured a $75,000 settlement against the
pharmaceutical giant along with the requirement that Purdue modify its

46. Bruce Japsen, Opioid Lawsuits Look More Like a Tobacco Settlement Every Day, FORBES
(Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2018/08/25/opioid-lawsuits-lookingmore-like-tobacco-settlements-every-day/#4035d0ab4f4f.
47. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 4, at 1–2.
48. See Transfer Order, supra note 2, at 3.
49. See, e.g., Opinion & Order Adopting Magistrate Judge’s Report & Recommendation
Denying Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss at 3, 6, 20, 31, 36, MDL No. 2804 (Dec. 19, 2018) (No.
1203).
50. Landon Thomas Jr., Maker of OxyContin Reaches Settlement with West Virginia, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/06/business/maker-of-oxycontin-reach
es-settlement-with-west-virginia.html.
51. Barry Meier, U.S. Maker of OxyContin Painkiller to Pay $600 Million in Guilty Plea, N.Y.
TIMES (May 11, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/11/business/worldbusiness/11iht-oxy.1
.5665287.html.
52. Kentucky Settles Lawsuit with OxyContin Maker for $24 Million, CBS NEWS (Dec. 23,
2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kentucky-settles-lawsuit-with-oxycontin-maker-for-24million/.
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marketing practices. 53 These examples demonstrate the sheer power of
spearheading health epidemic cases with government action.
D. More Differences than Similarities Between Big Tobacco Litigation and
the Opioid MDL
There are, in many ways, logical links between Big Tobacco litigation of the
1990s and today’s opioid MDL against Big Pharma. Namely, government
plaintiffs initiated both litigation proceedings in response to national public
health crises. The causes of action have been nearly identical in both sets of
proceedings. Moreover, the end goal of both proceedings has been a largescale,
comprehensive “master” or “global” settlement agreement purported to resolve
a gamut of cases pending across the country. Key differences in the opioid MDL,
however, have transformed the MDL into a truly one-of-a-kind proceeding.
1. County and City Plaintiffs Instead of Attorney General Plaintiffs
Unique to the opioid MDL is that counties and cities, rather than state
attorneys general, are the primary government plaintiffs spearheading the
litigation. 54 As of October 2019, the plaintiffs included more than 2,500 cities,
counties, tribal communities, and individuals spanning throughout the United
States, though the vast majority of the plaintiffs are counties and cities. 55 This
is to the great disdain of state attorneys general, many of whom are keen to enter
into a global settlement agreement that would distribute funds to state coffers
rather than grant proceeds directly to counties and cities. 56
2. Early Exits: Track One Settlement and Purdue Pharma’s Bankruptcy
Moreover, unlike in the tobacco cases, which did not produce a substantial
monetary award for any plaintiff until all the states settled for nearly $250
billion, 57 the opioid MDL has already produced an enormous settlement award
for two plaintiffs. Compared to the tobacco cases, unique to the opioid MDL is
the use of “bellwether” trials, or initial trials meant to set a precedent for how

53. Press Release, New York State Office of the Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman
Announces Settlement with Purdue Pharma That Ensures Responsible and Transparent Marketing
of Prescription Opioid Drugs by the Manufacturer (Aug. 20, 2015) (on file at the Attorney General
press release archives).
54. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 4, at 1–2, 31–32.
55. See, e.g., Colin Dwyer, Your Guide to the Massive (And Massively Complex) Opioid
Litigation, NPR (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/10/15/7615373
67/your-guide-to-the-massive-and-massively-complex-opioid-litigation.
56. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 4, at 31–32.
57. See Mather, supra note 20, at 898.
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other similarly-situated categories of MDL cases will proceed. 58 The first
bellwether trial was known as the “Track One” case, 59 and the two plaintiffs
were Cuyahoga County and Summit County in Ohio. 60 Opening statements were
set for Monday, October 21, 2019, 61 with closing arguments and jury
instructions to conclude no later than Friday, December 13, 2019. 62 Then, on
October 20, 2019, the eve of trial, four companies—Teva, Cardinal Health,
AmerisourceBergen, and McKesson—settled with Summit and Cuyahoga
Counties for $260 million. 63 Prior to the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement,
no county, city, or other plaintiff had prevailed in such a case against Big
Tobacco. 64
Big Tobacco litigation also did not see the bankruptcies of the biggest
defendant-manufacturers named in the proceedings, as the opioid MDL has seen
with the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharma. September 15, 2019 marked a
momentous day for the opioid MDL and for the history of the pharmaceutical
industry: Purdue Pharma, a company whose origins stem back to 1892 65 and
whose aggressive marketing tactics for OxyContin were alleged to have ignited
the opioid epidemic, 66 announced that it would file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 67
As part of the settlement, the notorious Sackler family agreed to relinquish 100%
control of the company and pay out a minimum of $3 billion in cash to plaintiffs
over the following seven years. 68 The family also agreed to restructure the entity

58. See Sarah K. Angelino & Stephen M. Copenhaver, Why Bellwethers Matter in the Opioid
MDL, SCHIFF HARDIN PUBLICATIONS (June 10, 2019), https://www.schiffhardin.com/insights/pub
lications/2019/why-bellwethers-matter-in-the-opioid-mdl.
59. Order Regarding Track One Trial Plaintiffs at 1, MDL No. 2804 (Feb. 25, 2019) (No.
1392).
60. Id. Originally, three cases were included as the Track One cases: (1) The Cty. of Summit,
Ohio v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 18-OP-45090 (N.D. Ohio); (2) The Cty. of Cuyahoga v. Purdue
Pharma L.P., No. 17-OP-45004 (N.D. Ohio); and (3) City of Cleveland v. AmerisourceBergen Drug
Corp., No. 18-OP-45132 (N.D. Ohio). Case Management Order No. 1, supra note 8, at 6. However,
the City of Cleveland was removed from the Track One cases and joined with the City of Akron.
Together, Cleveland and Akron are known as the “Municipal Plaintiffs” and will receive a trial date
after the trial date of the Track Two bellwethers (as defined in Doc. 1218).
61. Civil Jury Trial Order, supra note 8, at 3. A three-week trial was originally set for Monday,
March 18, 2019. Case Management Order No. 1, supra note 8, at 8.
62. Civil Jury Trial Order, supra note 8, at 3.
63. Opioid MDL Track One Cases Settle on Eve of Openings, Joe Rice Leads Negotiations,
supra note 13.
64. Mather, supra note 20, at 897.
65. Christopher Glazek, The Secretive Family Making Billions from the Opioid Crisis,
ESQUIRE (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a12775932/sackler-family-oxy
contin/.
66. See, e.g., Hoffman & Walsh, supra note 12; Thomas, supra note 50.
67. Restructure: Purdue Pharma Announces Agreement in Principle on Landmark Opioid
Litigation Settlement, supra note 11.
68. Hoffman & Walsh, supra note 12.
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into a public benefit trust and sell Mundipharma, their British-based company. 69
Proceeds from OxyContin and other drugs would also contribute to plaintiffs’
claims and further the research and development of addiction and overdose
drugs, which would be “donated to the public.” 70 Purdue estimated its settlement
to provide over $10 billion of aid to the opioid epidemic. 71
The company reached the agreement with twenty-four state attorneys
general, five territories, and several lead counsels in the opioid MDL. 72 Paul
Hanley Jr., co-lead counsel for the opioid MDL, welcomed the settlement,
stating, “A journey of a thousand miles starts with the first step,” and he hoped
the settlement would forge support for communities across the nation that have
suffered from the opioid crisis. 73
3. Negotiation Class
Further differing the opioid MDL from any other case in United States
history is Judge Polster’s unprecedented Negotiation Class that he certified
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on September 11, 2019. 74 The
Negotiation Class seeks to encourage a global settlement between a class of
forty-nine plaintiff representatives and thirteen defendants on behalf of every
county and city in the United States, 75 giving individual class members the
option to opt out by November 22, 2019. 76 While federal courts have
conventionally employed Rule 23 to certify “trial class actions” and “settlement
class actions,” Rule 23 had never been used to certify a “negotiation class action”
until the opioid MDL. 77 The Negotiation Class was a collaborative effort
between the Special Master, experts, and parties in the opioid MDL. 78
The purpose of the Negotiation Class is to require parties to opt out of
negotiation “prior to a settlement being reached, as is done in a normal class
action geared toward trial.” 79 The result is that class size is fixed prior to
negotiations. 80 This is in contrast to the “standard settlement class action,” which

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Restructure: Purdue Pharma Announces Agreement in Principle on Landmark Opioid
Litigation Settlement, supra note 11.
72. Id.
73. Elizabeth Joseph, Purdue Pharma Files for Bankruptcy as Part of a $10 Billion Agreement
to Settle Opioid Lawsuits, CNN (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/16/us/purdue-phar
ma-bankruptcy-filing/index.html.
74. See generally Order Certifying Negotiation Class & Approving Notice, supra note 10.
75. See id. at 1–3.
76. Id. at 1.
77. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 4, at 7.
78. Id. at 2.
79. Id. at 3.
80. See id.
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allows class members to opt out of the class after the parties reach a settlement. 81
The Negotiation Class quells defendants’ fears that many of the counties and
cities would simply opt out of settlement after a global settlement is reached,82
which would waste the time and resources spent to reach a global settlement
agreement if the parties would still have to entertain a panoply of potentially
significant claims. 83
The vast majority of attorneys general—including thirty-seven state
attorneys general, the attorney general of Washington, D.C., and the attorney
general of Guam—vehemently oppose the Negotiation Class. 84 The attorneys
general, who themselves are pursuing state-level opioid litigation and have
implied that the claims are the province of the states rather than the cities and
counties, 85 argue that Negotiation Class will impede global settlement rather
than promote it. 86 Judge Polster rejected this argument, reasoning that the
Negotiation Class “does not interfere with the States settling their own cases any
way they want, and it does not stop parties in the MDL from settling in other
ways . . . it does not stop any litigation from continuing and in no way interferes
with the upcoming bellwether trials in this MDL. This process simply provides
an option – and in the Court’s opinion, it is a powerful, creative, and helpful
one.” 87
The Northern District of Ohio has created a website for the Negotiation
Class that includes an interactive Allocation Map based on a “hypothetical $1
billion gross settlement for Counties and Cities” spanning all fifty states,
Washington D.C., and Puerto Rico. 88 The amount to be allocated to each county
or city is based on a metric that takes into account population and the impact of
the opioid crisis on that locality. Of that total hypothetical $1 billion settlement,
$150 million would be reserved for a Special Needs Fund designed to allow
Class members to recover litigation costs or obtain additional relief for local
impact of the opioid crisis, and $100 million would be reserved in a Private
Attorneys’ Fee Fund. 89 The website’s hypothetical settlement, after these costs,
would leave behind $750 million for counties and cities. 90
For all of these reasons, the opioid MDL is truly an unparalleled colossus
that cannot be squarely perfectly against Big Tobacco.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 4, at 2.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 5.
85. Id. at 31.
86. Id. at 3.
87. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 4, at 3–4.
88. In Re: National Prescription Opiated Litigation: Allocation Map, OPIOIDS NEGOT. CLASS,
https://allocationmap.iclaimsonline.com/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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III. WHY A GLOBAL OPIOID SETTLEMENT WILL BE FAR SMALLER THAN THE
TOBACCO MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
The stark differences between tobacco and opioid litigation highlight the
unique factors underlying the opioid MDL. Three key reasons drive why a global
settlement in the opioid MDL will be far smaller than the $206 billion tobacco
Master Settlement Agreement: (1) opioid defendants can shift blame onto a
number of other culpable parties, paving the way for causation defenses that
were largely unavailable for the tobacco industry; (2) opioids have undeniable
health benefits, leading to the medical community’s demand for drugs exactly
like OxyContin in the years leading up to its FDA approval; and (3) the
pharmaceutical industry is less financially viable than it outwardly appears,
which is evidenced by a number of recent bankruptcies of opioid manufacturers.
A.

Defenses Unique to Opioids: Shifting Blame onto Other Culpable Parties

Today, opioid plaintiffs face far more legal barriers than did tobacco
plaintiffs. 91 Drug manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies have a unique
advantage of being able to pass blame onto the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), doctors,
and individual consumers, all of whom have at least partially contributed to the
opioid epidemic. 92 Such arguments were largely unavailable for the tobacco
industry, which had complete control over the manufacturing, marketing, and
distribution of a single product. 93
1. FDA as a Gatekeeper
One of the most significant differences between tobacco products and
opioids lies in the FDA. Tobacco was unregulated by the FDA until 2009. 94 For
tobacco plaintiffs in the 1990s and early 2000s, the absence of regulatory
oversight meant plaintiffs could place blame directly on tobacco companies for
fraudulent marketing schemes. 95 Additionally, tobacco plaintiffs could use the
absence of FDA oversight to advocate for why tobacco products should be

91. Nora Freeman Engstrom & Michelle M. Mello, Suing the Opioid Companies, STAN. L.
SCH. (Aug. 30, 2018), https://law.stanford.edu/2018/08/30/q-and-a-with-mello-and-engstrom/.
92. Brit McCandless Farmer, The Opioid Epidemic: Who Is to Blame?, 60 MINUTES (Feb. 24,
2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-opioid-epidemic-who-is-to-blame-60-minutes/.
93. Jan Hoffman, Payout from a National Opioids Settlement Won’t Be as Big as Hoped, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/health/national-opioid-settle
ment.html.
94. See generally Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301
(2009); 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).
95. See generally U.S. v. Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 839, 899–900 (D.D.C. 2006)
(holding that substantial evidence established the defendant tobacco companies violated RICO by
engaging in a massive fifty-year scheme to defraud the public, including consumers of cigarettes).
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regulated by the FDA. 96 Opioids, however, are subject to rigorous FDA
oversight from the initial drug application and approval process all the way
through post-approval monitoring. 97 Congress has empowered the FDA to
ensure that new drugs are both “safe” and “effective” before they may be
introduced in interstate commerce. 98
Drug companies have thus been able to successfully argue immunity
because of the FDA’s ultimate authority to approve new drugs. 99 Under
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Community, state law claims alleging that drug
companies committed fraud on the FDA are preempted by the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 100 The Court explained this is because the
FDCA empowers the FDA alone, not the states, to police and investigate
suspected fraud. 101 Buckman’s reasoning was reaffirmed and extended in Riegel
v. Medtronic, Inc., where the Court held that the FDA’s premarket approval
process satisfies federal safety requirements and that common law claims of
negligence, strict liability, and implied warranty are preempted by the FDCA. 102
Even before Buckman and Riegel, drug manufacturers were able to prevail on
similar arguments. For example, under one Michigan law, drug manufacturers
enjoyed an absolute defense from product liability suits (which, in Michigan,
include fraud and misleading marketing claims) if: (1) the FDA approved the
safety and efficacy of the drug and (2) “the drug and labeling were in compliance
with [the FDA’s] approval at the time the drug left the control of the
manufacturer.” 103

96. In Philip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 216, the court referenced in its more than 1,600-page
opinion the FDA’s Final Rule that “[a]ll major public health organizations in the United States and
abroad” recognized that nicotine in cigarettes and smokeless tobacco was addictive (citing 1996
FDA Jurisdictional Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 44619 (Aug. 1996) at xv, XVA1242326-3211 at
2572 (US 64323)). Addiction was used by the FDA to argue that nicotine should be considered a
drug subject to FDA regulation. See id.
97. See generally, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 355-360 (2018).
98. Id.
99. See generally Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001); Riegel
v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 345 (2008).
100. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353.
101. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 348.
102. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323–30. While Buckman and Riegel involved medical devices rather
than prescription drugs, courts have applied the same reasoning to suits against drug manufacturers.
Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 965–66 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that preemption
under Buckman applies not only to medical device claims, but to drug claims as well).
103. Garcia, 385 F.3d at 963–64; Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2946 (1996). In Garcia, the Sixth
Circuit held that the Michigan statute was wholly preempted under the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Buckman. Garcia, 385 F.3d at 965–67. The Buckman preemption had the effect of preventing
claims arising under the Michigan statute from being brought at all in Michigan state court. This
was to the vast benefit of drug companies—drug companies went from being granted immunity
under state law, to then being granted federal preemption.
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Perhaps even more simply, drug manufacturers can argue FDA approval
means there is a gatekeeper to blame when drugs with adverse effects reach the
public. The FDA itself touts, “American consumers benefit from having access
to the safest and most advanced pharmaceutical system in the world. The main
consumer watchdog in this system is FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research (CDER).” 104 When a drug manufacturer develops a new drug, the drug
must undergo preclinical animal testing; 105 followed by an “investigational new
drug” application; 106 followed by three phases of human clinical trials; 107
followed finally by an “NDA,” or new drug application, which, if approved by
the FDA, ensures that the drug’s health “benefits exceed the risks.” 108 During
the three phases of human clinical trials, approximately seventy percent of drugs
qualify to pass from Phase I to Phase II, and only about thirty-three percent of
those remaining drugs are able to move from Phase II to Phase III. 109 After
undergoing such a strenuous approval process, it is difficult to convince a jury
that an FDA-approved drug is defective. 110 In 2016, Purdue Pharma was able to
cite over twenty years of scientific research, including over a dozen controlled
clinical studies, supporting the FDA’s approval of its twelve-hour dosing for
OxyContin extended-release tablets. 111 Purdue stated its warning label was
updated more than thirty times and that “at no point did FDA request a change
to [OxyContin’s] dosing frequency.” 112 Such statements only lend further
credence to pharmaceutical companies’ ability to use the FDA as a shield to
liability.
2. DEA as a Sleeping Watchdog
In addition to FDA approval of opioids is DEA oversight of them. The
Controlled Substances Act of 1970 required drug manufacturers and distributors
to report their controlled substance transactions directly to the U.S. Attorney
General, and in turn, the Attorney General delegates that authority to the DEA
(an arm of the U.S. Department of Justice). 113 The database by which drug
companies report that information is known as the Automation of Reports and
104. Development & Approval Process (Drugs), FDA (June 13, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/
drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/default.htm.
105. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(5) (2018).
106. Id. § 312.20(a).
107. Id. § 312.21(a)-(c).
108. Id. § 314.50.
109. Step 3: Clinical Research, FDA (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approv
als/Drugs/ucm405622.htm.
110. Engstrom & Mello, supra note 91.
111. E.g., Harriet Ryan, Purdue Pharma Issues Statement on Oxycontin Report; L.A. Times
Responds, L.A. TIMES (May 6, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/projects/purdue-response/.
112. Id.
113. Automation of Reports and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS), DEA, https://www.dea
diversion.usdoj.gov/arcos/index.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2020).
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Consolidated Order System (ARCOS). 114 “ACROS is an automated,
comprehensive drug reporting system which monitors the flow of DEA
controlled substances from their point of manufacture through commercial
distribution channels to the point of sale or distribution at the dispensing/retail
level - hospitals, retail pharmacies, practitioners, mid-level practitioners, and
teaching institutions.” 115 ACROS accumulates these transactions and
summarizes them into reports that give federal and state government agencies
information necessary “to identify the diversion of controlled substances into
illicit channels of distribution.” 116 Such information can then be used by U.S.
Attorneys and the DEA to prosecute drug crimes. 117
In July 2019, undisclosed ARCOS data were brought to light that revealed
the DEA knew America’s largest drug distributors had released seventy-six
billion oxycodone and hydrocodone pills throughout the United States between
the years 2006 and 2012. 118 During that period, ARCOS had tracked the “path
of every single pain pill sold in the United States—from manufacturers and
distributors to pharmacies in every town and city.” 119 The ARCOS data revealed
a number of red flags suggesting that high volumes of pills violated federal law,
and patterns indicated that the opioids were being diverted to the black
market. 120 The three states with the highest concentrations of opioid pills per
person were West Virginia with 66.5 pills per person, Kentucky with 63.3 pills
per person, and South Carolina with 58 pills per person—numbers that far
exceeded reasonable use. 121 The DEA had sole access to this data for years and
failed to act on it or release it. 122
Six distributors were responsible for the distribution of seventy-five percent
of the pills: McKesson Corp., Walgreens, Cardinal Health, AmerisourceBergen,

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Scott Higham et al., 76 Billion Opioid Pills: Newly Released Federal Data Unmasks the
Epidemic, WASH. POST (July 16, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/76billion-opioid-pills-newly-released-federal-data-unmasks-the-epidemic/2019/07/16/5f29fd62a73e-11e9-86dd-d7f0e60391e9_story.html. Discovery during the opioid MDL revealed the
possibility that the ARCOS data would be key to litigation. In June 2019, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals agreed to make the ARCOS data public after a push from media, primarily from The
Washington Post. See, e.g., Joseph F. Rice, Sixth Circuit Ruling Regarding ARCOS Data in the
Opioid Litigation Is Welcome, MOTLEY RICE LLC (June 20, 2019), https://www.motleyrice.com/
blogpost/arcos-data-opioid-litigation-sixth-circuit; Opioid Litigation, MOTLEY RICE LLC,
https://www.motleyrice.com/public-client/opioid-litigation (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
119. Higham et al., supra note 118.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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CVS, and Walmart. 123 Three manufacturers, SpecGx, a subsidiary of
Mallinckrodt; Actavis Pharma; and Par Pharmaceutical, a subsidiary of Endo
Pharmaceuticals, manufactured eighty-eight percent of the pills. 124
After the release of the ARCOS data, drug distributors were readily prepared
to condemn the government for failing to do more to address the crisis.
McKesson spokeswoman Kristen Chasen responded, “For decades, DEA has
had exclusive access to this data, which can identify the total volumes of
controlled substances being ordered, pharmacy-by-pharmacy, across the
country.” 125 The DEA, as the overseer of drug manufacture and distribution, sets
the quota for how many opioids manufacturers can produce and tracks where
they can go. 126 Via ARCOS, the DEA had therefore not only approved drug
manufacturers’ production of exorbitant numbers of opioid pills, but the DEA
also blessed distribution of those pills to pharmacies all across the country. 127
3. Physician Behavior and the Learned Intermediary Doctrine
Aside from government oversight, further removing manufacturers and
distributors from the opioid crisis is physician autonomy. The FDA is primarily
a consumer protection agency that does not regulate physicians’ behavior. 128
Therefore, while the FDA approves drug labels and recommends certain uses
for approved drugs, 129 physicians are generally free to use their own medical
judgment to prescribe drugs for whatever medical purposes they see fit, a
practice known as “off-label” prescribing. 130 FDA drug approval also means the
causal link between drug manufacturers’ alleged failure to warn and physicians’
prescribing practices is broken under the learned intermediary doctrine. 131

123. Id.
124. Higham et al., supra note 118.
125. Id.
126. Zachary Siegel, The Opioid Crisis Is About More than Corporate Greed, NEW REPUBLIC
(July 30, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/154560/opioid-crisis-corporate-greed.
127. Id.
128. Kelly K. Dineen & James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Can Physicians
Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 AM. J.L. & MED.
7, 28 (2016).
129. Understanding Unapproved Use of Approved Drugs “Off Label,” FDA (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-expanded-access-and-other-treatment-options/under
standing-unapproved-use-approved-drugs-label.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Timmons v. Purdue Pharma Co., No. 8:04-CV-1479-T-26MAP, 2006 WL
263602, at *4 (M.D. Fl. Feb. 2, 2006) (reasoning that even if OxyContin’s warning label was
insufficient, all physicians were able to testify that they independently knew the risks of OxyContin
addiction, and there was therefore insufficient evidence to show that the physicians were deceived
by the defendants’ marketing. Moreover, “…the learned intermediary doctrine precluded a finding
of causation between Purdue’s misrepresentations and/or failure to warn regarding the
addictiveness of OxyContin…”).
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Generally, under the learned intermediary doctrine, “once a manufacturer
warns a doctor about a drug’s inherent dangers, [the manufacturer] has fulfilled
its legal duty to provide a warning.” 132 The manufacturer’s duty to warn the
prescribing physician displaces the manufacturer’s duty to warn patients directly
of the drug’s inherent dangers. 133 “The reasoning behind this rule is that the
doctor acts as a learned intermediary between the patient and the prescription
drug manufacturer by assessing the medical risks in light of the patient’s
needs.” 134 Under the learned intermediary doctrine, a plaintiff generally must
demonstrate that: (1) the manufacturer failed to provide an adequate warning to
the prescribing physician of the dangers inherent in the use of the product, and
(2) the omission was the proximate cause of injury. 135
However, even if a plaintiff succeeds in proving the elements of the learned
intermediary doctrine, the doctrine further shields a manufacturer if the
physician otherwise acquired independent knowledge of the risks associated
with a prescription drug. 136 Where the physician’s independent knowledge is
“substantially the same” as that which an adequate warning label would have
communicated, the causal link between the plaintiff’s injury and the
manufacturer’s alleged failure to warn is broken, and the plaintiff cannot
establish proximate cause. 137 Further, even where the FDA recommends more
rigorous warnings from a manufacturer, the doctrine may bar a plaintiff’s
recovery so long as the manufacturer warned of inherent risks associated with a
drug. 138 Every federal Circuit Court that has taken up a learned intermediary
appeal has affirmed summary judgment or dismissal in favor of drug
manufacturers. 139 No federal case has reversed in favor of plaintiffs.
132. Wright ex rel. Trust Co. of Kansas v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir.
2001); Eck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256 F.3d 1013, 1017 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting the exception to
the manufacturer’s duty to warn under the learned intermediary doctrine. “[W]here a product is
properly prepared and marketed and proper warning is given to the prescribing physicians, the
manufacturer is shielded from liability.”).
133. Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 706 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
134. Eck, 256 F.3d at 1017.
135. See Christopher v. Cutter Labs., 53 F.3d 1184, 1192 (11th Cir. 1995).
136. Id. at 1192.
137. Id.
138. See Wright ex rel. Trust Co. of Kansas v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1233–35
(10th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment for the manufacturer when the manufacturer had
already warned the hospital of a drug’s inherent risks through the package slip, but the FDA
recommended further warnings); but cf. Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals, 933 P.2d 298, 299
(Okla. 1997) (holding that a manufacturer’s “compliance with FDA warning requirements does not
necessarily satisfy the manufacturer’s common law duty to warn the consumer”).
139. Dean v. Eli Lilly & Co., 387 F. App’x 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Avandia Marketing,
Sales Practices and Prods. Liability Litigation, 746 F. App’x 122, 124 (3d Cir. 2018); Talley v.
Danek Medical, Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 164 (4th Cir. 1999); Ackermann v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals,
526 F.3d 203, 214 (5th Cir. 2008); Meridia Products Liability Litigation v. Abbott Labs., 447 F.3d
861, 869 (6th Cir. 2006); Ziliak v. AstraZeneca LP, 324 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2003); Elhis v.
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In addition to barring failure to warn claims, the learned intermediary
doctrine may be used to bar plaintiffs’ false advertising claims as well. For
example, in Dean v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Second Circuit employed the learned
intermediary doctrine to reject the plaintiff’s argument that “overpromotion of a
product negates any warnings.” 140 Although the plaintiff was able to point to the
defendant’s vigorous sales campaign for the drug that was aimed at the doctor,
there was no evidence that the manufacturer’s salespeople either misled the
doctor about the link between the drug and the injury, or that the salespeople
caused the doctor to prescribe the drug to the plaintiff. 141 Instead, the evidence
showed that the doctor’s prescription of the drug was based on the patient’s prior
success with the drug and an assessment of the patient’s needs. 142
Few learned intermediary cases have been used against opioid
manufacturers. However, in the ones that have, manufacturers have emerged
undefeated. For example, in Bodie v. Purdue Pharma L.P., the plaintiff’s claims
were barred because the prescribing physician had independent knowledge of
the risks of OxyContin addiction. 143 Similarly, in Foister v. Purdue Pharma,
L.P., a Kentucky court adopted, for the first time, the learned intermediary
doctrine when it barred an individual opioid addict plaintiff’s failure to warn
claim when the warning label clearly stated that the drugs should not be chewed
or snorted. 144
The expectation of physician responsibility has extended to criminal
proceedings as well. In June 2018, when the Department of Justice announced
the largest health care fraud takedown in U.S. history, 162 health care providers
were charged for their roles in illegally prescribing and distributing opioids and
other narcotics. 145 Doctors who run “pill mills,” such as Dr. Jacqueline
Cleggett, 146 give doctors an increasingly bad reputation for contributing to the
Shire Richwood, Inc., 367 F.3d 1013, 1019 (8th Cir. 2004); Eck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256 F.3d
1013, 1024 (10th Cir. 2001); Dietz v. Smithkline Beechman Corp., 598 F.3d 812, 816 (11th Cir.
2010).
140. Dean, 387 F. App’x. at 29.
141. Id.
142. Id. Cf. Tyree v. Boston Scientific Corp., 56 F. Supp. 3d 826, 833 (S.D.W.V. 2014) (holding
that the learned intermediary doctrine would not have protected the manufacturer if it had
advertised directly to patients, but the doctrine was controlling because the manufacturer did not
advertise to patients).
143. Bodie v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 236 Fed. App’x. 511, 516, 521 (11th Cir. 2007).
144. Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 696 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
145. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, National Health Care Fraud Takedown Results in Charges Against
601 Individuals Responsible for Over $2 Billion in Fraud Losses (June 28, 2018), https://www.jus
tice.gov/opa/pr/national-health-care-fraud-takedown-results-charges-against-601-individuals-re
sponsible-over.
146. Mahita Gajanan, Netflix’s The Pharmacist Depicts the True Story of Grieving Father’s
Fight Against the Opioid Epidemic, TIME (Feb. 6, 2020), https://time.com/5778759/the-pharmacist
-netflix/. Cleggett was made notable in the Netflix docuseries, The Pharmacist, for running a pain
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opioid epidemic. They also give drug manufacturers further credence under the
learned intermediary doctrine for why doctors should know better than to
irresponsibly—or even illegally—prescribe dangerous narcotics.
4. Consumer Behavior
Aside from the FDA and physicians, other issues of causation arise with
individuals’ addiction, abuse, and criminal behavior. In 2017, West Virginia had
the highest rate of opioid-related overdose deaths in the United States, with a
rate of 49.6 deaths per 100,000 persons—more than three times that of the
national rate of 14.6 deaths per 100,000. 147 While doctors were partially to
blame, 148 the majority of those deaths were attributable to synthetic opioids and
heroin, 149 which are not created by drug manufacturers. Similar to individual
tobacco plaintiffs, to whom courts have been largely unsympathetic, 150 courts
today take issue with awarding damages to individual drug addicts. For example,
in Foister v. Purdue Pharma, a Kentucky court rejected the plaintiffs’
“victimization” mentality when they had engaged in crushing, snorting, and
injecting OxyContin and had histories of abusing prescription medications. 151 In
Ashley County v. Pfizer, twenty individual counties in Arkansas pursued
equitable relief against the manufacturer of an over-the-counter cold medicine
for not taking adequate steps to prevent the cold medicine from being converted
into methamphetamine.152 The Eighth Circuit dismissed the case, reasoning:
Proximate cause is bottomed on public policy as a limitation on how far society
is willing to extend liability for a defendant’s actions. As a federal court
construing state law, we are very reluctant to open Pandora’s box to the
avalanche of actions that would follow if we found this case to state a cause of
action under Arkansas law. We could easily predict that the next lawsuit would
be against farmers’ cooperatives for not telling their farmer customers to
sufficiently safeguard their anhydrous ammonia . . . tanks from theft by
methamphetamine cooks. And what of the liability of manufacturers in other
management clinic in New Orleans, which was a hub of the opioid epidemic. Id. Cleggett had a
habit of prescribing individuals who did not show signs of chronic pain or illness 40 mg or more of
OxyContin, often in combination with medications like Xanax and Soma, for a deadly combination
known as the “holy trinity.” Id. Cleggett lost her license and pleaded guilty in 2009 to illegally
dispensing controlled substances. Id.
147. West Virginia Opioid Summary, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Mar. 2019),
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-summaries-by-state/west-virginia-opioidsummary.
148. See id. In 2013, West Virginia doctors were writing around 125 opioid prescriptions per
100 persons. In 2017, they were writing 81.3 opioid prescriptions per every 100 persons, compared
to the average U.S. rate of 58.7 prescriptions. Id.
149. Id.
150. Sherrill, supra note 29, at 497.
151. Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 695–701 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
152. Ashley County v. Pfizer, 552 F.3d 659, 662–63, 673 (8th Cir. 2009).
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industries that, if stretched far enough, can be linked to other societal
problems? 153

This logic is extended to cases barring plaintiffs’ recovery because of their
own contributory negligence and wrongful conduct. 154 Individual West Virginia
plaintiffs have been unable to recover damages against drug manufacturers
because their own behavior precludes a finding of proximate cause. 155
Taken together, all of these actors allow opioid defendants to mitigate their
liability by breaking the causal chain of liability. This simply was not the case
for Big Tobacco. “[F]our cigarette companies produced a single product—one
whose dangers were undisputed.” 156 Cigarettes were everywhere, and their
impact insidious, but there was no else to blame but tobacco companies.
B.

The Relationship Between Opioids and Doctors: It’s Complicated

Lingering behind all of this is perhaps the biggest difference: there is no
health benefit in smoking, 157 but there are undeniable health benefits to opioid
therapy. 158 As such, the medical community has a complex, longstanding history
with opioids that came in waves of rejection and support for opioid therapy. 159
Complicating the opioid epidemic is the medical community’s position on
opioids in the years leading up to OxyContin’s approval: that opioids were nonaddictive. In 1980, Jane Porter and Hershel Jick published a letter in the New
England Journal of Medicine that became the basis of the medical community’s
widespread understanding that opioid use rarely resulted in addiction. 160 A 1986
retrospective analysis of thirty-eight patients taking opioids for chronic pain
concluded that only two of the patients misused or abused the drugs, and it

153. Id. at 671.
154. E.g., McCauley v. Purdue Pharma LP, 331 F. Supp. 2d 449, 452 (W.D. Va. 2004); Orzel
by Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 210–11 (Mich. 1995).
155. McCauley, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 462.
156. Hoffman, supra note 93.
157. See generally Smoking & Tobacco Use: Tobacco-Related Mortality, CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/health_effects/tobacco_related_mortality/
(last visited Apr. 11, 2020).
158. See generally Brief for Center for Public Health Law Research at Temple University et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Settlement with Favorable Public Health Outcomes at 15–16, MDL
No. 2804 (discussing that opioid treatment is vital in three areas: “1. Short-term treatment of severe
acute pain; 2. Sustained treatment of cancer-related pain and end-of-life care; and 3. Sustained
treatment of opioid use disorder (OUD) with opioid maintenance medications, including
methadone and buprenorphine.”).
159. See generally, e.g., Mark R. Jones et al., A Brief History of the Opioid Epidemic and
Strategies for Pain Medicine, 7 PAIN THERAPY 13 (2018).
160. Jane Porter & Hershel Jick, Addiction Rare in Patients Treated with Narcotics, 302 N.
ENG. J. MED. 123, 123 (1980); Jones et al., supra note 159, at 15.
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maintained that both patients had a prior history of drug abuse. 161 That same
year, the World Health Organization shed light on the under-treatment of cancer
pain and suggested that opioid analgesics were an avenue by which to alleviate
pain. 162 Ronald Melzack pondered “the tragedy of needless pain” in 1990 and
suggested that morphine should be available for patients with chronic pain rather
than remain limited to cancer patients. 163
Thus, when the FDA first approved OxyContin (“oxycodone controlledrelease”) in 1995, 164 it was in response to the medical community’s demand for
drugs exactly like OxyContin. This accordingly allows drug manufacturers to
use the theory behind the learned intermediary doctrine as a basis for why it
created the drugs in the first place: doctors had concluded that opioids were safe,
doctors wanted to prescribe opioids to their patients, and doctors are better suited
than drug companies to decide what is best for patients. Pharmaceutical
companies like Purdue can therefore argue, in a sense, that necessity bred
innovation.
Immediately following the FDA’s approval of OxyContin, the American
Pain Society launched its campaign for “pain as the fifth vital sign,” which the
Veteran’s Health Administration adopted in its policies. 165 In 1997, the
Federation of State Medical Boards released statements acknowledging that it
would lessen its control over physicians’ prescriptions of opioids, which the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Agency fully endorsed. 166 In 2000, The Joint Commission
(TJC) published strict standards for pain management in hospitals that
recommended physicians rely on patients’ self-reported pain score, and those
standards required an “acceptable” pain score before a patient could be
discharged from post-anesthesia care units. 167 In response, physicians
aggressively prescribed opioids out of fear that failure to meet TJC standards
would result in withholding of federal funds for their hospitals. 168 Through
enforcing TJC standards, hospitals all but forced the overprescription of opioids
161. Russell K. Portenoy & Kathleen M. Foley, Chronic Use of Opioid Analgesics in Nonmalignant Pain: Report of 38 Cases, 25 PAIN 171, 173, 177 (1986); Jones et al., supra note 159, at
15.
162. WHO, CANCER PAIN RELIEF 7–8 (1986); Jones et al., supra note 159, at 15.
163. Ronald Melzack, The Tragedy of Needless Pain, 262 SCI. AM. 27, 27 (1990); Jones et al.,
supra note 159, at 15.
164. Timeline of Selected FDA Activities and Significant Events Addressing Opioid Misuse and
Abuse, FDA (May 30, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/
ucm338566.htm.
165. Jones et al., supra note 159, at 15.
166. David E. Joranson et al., Pain Management, Controlled Substances, and State Medical
Board Policy: A Decade of Change, 23 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 138, 142–43 (2002); Jones et
al., supra note 159, at 16.
167. David W. Baker, History of The Joint Commission’s Pain Standards: Lessons for Today’s
Prescription Opioid Epidemic, 317 JAMA 1117, 1117 (2017).
168. Jones et al., supra note 159, at 16.
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in efforts to remain compliant with TJC and boost patient satisfaction scores. 169
This was particularly dangerous when hospitals tied their physicians’
compensation to patient satisfaction scores. 170
With the institutionalized dogma of what constituted best medical practices
for pain management, an entire generation of doctors had fostered a deep-seated
habit of aggressive opioid prescription. Then, as soon as the medical consensus
changed and doctors concluded that opioids were addictive, drug manufacturers
were readily able to argue under the learned intermediary doctrine that doctors
should have known better than to irresponsibly prescribe opioids.
C. Big Pharma: A Different Financial Ball Game than Big Tobacco
Another glaring factor drives why a global opioid settlement will be far
smaller than the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement: Big Pharma simply has
less money than many think it does. In 2016, U.S. tobacco sales totaled $94.4
billion, while prescription opioid sales only totaled $8.5 billion. 171 Meanwhile,
in 2016, Big Tobacco generated nearly $20 billion in net profits (emphasis in
original). 172 Annual prescription opioid sales amount to even less than the $9.1
billion that Big Tobacco spends each year just on marketing and advertising
alone. 173
Experts estimate that if all national distributors paid an amount proportional
to the quantity of opioids they distribute to their own pharmacies (the
determination of how distributors are generally sued), the amount would be
about $13.8 Billion total. 174 Three drug distributors (AmerisourceBergen,
Cardinal Health, and McKesson Corporation) and two manufacturers (Johnson
& Johnson and Teva) have tentatively proposed a $48 Billion settlement, much
of it to be paid out over eighteen years. 175 However, about half of that amount is
an assessment of the value of addiction treatment and services that the
companies vow to provide in the future. 176
Manufacturers similarly do not have the assets to produce a tobacco-like
settlement, and they perhaps have even fewer assets than distributors. When
169. Id.
170. See Joshua J. Fenton et al., The Cost of Satisfaction: A National Study of Patient
Satisfaction, Health Care Utilization, Expenditures, and Mortality, 172 ARCH INTERNAL MED. 405,
405 (2012).
171. Terry & Hoss, supra note 34.
172. Michelle L. Richards, Pills, Public Nuisance, and Parens Patriae: Questioning the
Propriety of the Posture of the Opioid Litigation, 54 U. RICH. L. REV. 405, 451 (2020).
173. Broken Promises to Our Children: A State-by-State Look at the 1998 State Tobacco
Settlement 21 Years Later, supra note 42.
174. Hoffman, supra note 93.
175. Tom Hals & Nate Raymond, Several States Wary of $48 billion Opioid Settlement
Proposal, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-opioid-lawsuits/sever
al-states-wary-of-48-billion-opioid-settlement-proposal-idUSKBN1X315P.
176. Id.; Hoffman, supra note 93.
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Purdue Pharma filed for bankruptcy and agreed to pay out a minimum of $3
billion in cash over the next seven years, several states, including Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts, and New York, vehemently opposed the settlement. 177 These
states sought to hold the Sackler family personally liable, alleging that the family
used Purdue to transfer billions of dollars to shell corporations and private
accounts. 178 Pennsylvania Attorney General Josh Shapiro said the settlement
was a “slap in the face to everyone who has had to bury a loved one due to this
family’s destruction and greed” and that it “allow[ed] the Sackler family to walk
away billionaires and admit no wrongdoing.” 179
From the outset, the Sackler family does appear enormously wealthy. There
is a Sackler Wing at New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art; other Sacker
wings at the Louvre and the Royal Academy; Sackler museums at Harvard and
Peking Universities; a Sackler Center at the Guggenheim; even a species of pink
rose and an asteroid are named after the Sacklers. 180 Forbes named the Sackler
family the nineteenth richest family in America in 2016, estimating a net worth
of $13 billion. 181 However, this merely demonstrates that all of the Sackler
family’s personal wealth and Purdue’s assets combined would still fail to even
approach the $206 billion tobacco Master Settlement Agreement. Purdue’s
bankruptcy thus reflects the simple reality that opioid manufacturers lack the
financial ability to resolve the estimated $2.5-trillion cost of the opioid
epidemic. 182
Purdue’s bankruptcy and agreement to pay out just $3 billion also created a
strategic defense for other companies: settle early, file for bankruptcy if
necessary, and do it for less than $3 billion. Simply put, when Purdue Pharma—
the center of much discovery, litigation, and negative publicity 183—settles for
only $3 billion, it stands to reason that the remaining defendants will argue that
they should pay less than the company that developed and manufactured
OxyContin. This is exactly what Mallinckrodt PLC did when it settled and filed
bankruptcy for $1.6 billion in February 2020. 184
Bankrupting pharmaceutical companies also has negative public health and
societal implications. Pharmaceutical companies are sources of life-saving

177. See Joseph, supra note 73; Hoffman & Walsh, supra note 12.
178. Hoffman & Walsh, supra note 12.
179. Joseph, supra note 73.
180. Glazek, supra note 65.
181. America’s Richest Families 2016, FORBES (June 29, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/pro
file/sackler/?list=families#61bf7b7e5d63.
182. See Hoffman, supra note 93.
183. See generally Sari Horwitz et al., ‘SELL BABY SELL!’: Unsealed Documents in Opioids
Lawsuit Reveal Inner Workings on Industry’s Marketing Machine, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/opioid-marketing/.
184. Gladstone et al., supra note 14.
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vaccines, drugs, and medical devices. 185 In the twentieth century alone,
pharmaceutical companies developed therapies for a number of previously
untreatable diseases, including drugs for heart disease, arthritis, high blood
pressure, bacterial infections, anxiety, asthma, cancer, and AIDS, in addition to
developing the first prescription contraceptives. 186 When the United States faced
frequent polio epidemics in the early 1950s, Dr. Jonas Salk and others sought
the help of pharmaceutical companies to ensure adequate public administration
of the polio vaccine. 187 It similarly stands to reason that when new epidemics
and pandemics inevitably devastate future populations, the world will look to
researchers and the pharmaceutical industry as first responders. Bankrupting Big
Pharma would disproportionately harm more people worldover than it would
help victims of the opioid epidemic—particularly when pharmaceutical
companies create the very medications that help to treat opioid addiction.
IV. SOLUTION: AVOIDING ANOTHER BIG TOBACCO BLUNDER THROUGH
LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION
All of these factors demonstrate that a global opioid settlement arising out
of the opioid MDL is inevitable, and it will likely be dwarfed by the $246 billion
total award that the tobacco plaintiffs were able to obtain in 1998. A smaller
global settlement, however, even as small as $50 billion, could still be
enormously successful if the proceeds are channeled directly into evidencebased public health initiatives at the local level.
The opioid crisis is a uniquely local problem that impacts rural counties and
urban cities alike. 188 It is counties and cities that bear the brunt of not only
financial costs of addiction, but also human costs of lives lost in their
communities. 189 Counties and cities view themselves as being entrusted to serve
the health, safety, and vitality of their communities. 190 They are eager to join the

185. See Stewart Lyman, Pharma’s Tarnished Reputation Helps Fuel the Anti-Vaccine
Movement, STAT (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/26/anti-vaccine-movementpharma-tarnished-reputation/.
186. Id.
187. See id. See also Paul A. Offit, Why Are Pharmaceutical Companies Gradually
Abandoning Vaccines?, HEALTH AFF. (May/June 2005), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/
10.1377/hlthaff.24.3.622 (discussing the role of pharmaceutical companies such as Eli Lilly, Parke
Davis, Pitman-Moore, Wyeth Laboratories, and Cutter Laboratories in the testing, production, and
distribution of Jonas Salk’s polio vaccine).
188. See generally NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES & NAT’L ASS’N OF CTYS., A PRESCRIPTION FOR
ACTION: LOCAL LEADERSHIP IN ENDING THE OPIOID CRISIS 3 (2016).
189. See id. at 17.
190. See id. at 3.
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MDL fight, in part because of state laws that limit local governments’ ability to
recover under the types of causes of action brought in the opioid MDL. 191
The answer to better use of settlement funds therefore rests with counties
and cities, rather than states, directly addressing the opioid crisis by enacting
evidence-based public health initiatives in their own communities. If counties
and cities lack the infrastructure to act alone, then similarly situated counties
should their pool settlement proceeds from a global MDL settlement to
implement solutions that would best suit addressing the opioid epidemic in their
particular localities. State attorneys general should not be permitted to thwart the
negotiations of county and city plaintiffs in the opioid MDL, nor should they be
permitted to usurp the proceeds of a global MDL settlement.
A.

Lessons from Big Tobacco: Settlement Proceeds Going to State Coffers
Means Little to No Spending Accountability

The goal of a comprehensive opioid settlement must be a plan that tangibly
addresses the opioid epidemic, not just a settlement agreement that procures the
largest monetary award for plaintiffs and state attorneys general. This is a lesson
that comes directly from the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement. Today, over
twenty years after the tobacco settlement, state attorneys general have allocated
a devastatingly low proportion to the intended purpose of funding public health
measures and smoking cessation programs. There is already some reason to fear
the same result would ensue if attorneys general take over opioid MDL
negotiations.
For example, West Virginia, the state with the worst overdose rate in the
nation, 192 used funds from a 2004 opioid settlement with Purdue Pharma to
remodel its state’s police academy by building a brand-new fitness center. 193
When Oklahoma opted out of the opioid MDL and pursued opioid defendants in
state court, the state obtained a $270 million settlement from Purdue Pharma in
March 2019. 194 A measly $12.5 million of the proceeds went to counties and
municipalities in Oklahoma; $60 million went to legal fees. 195 In August 2019,
Oklahoma obtained a $572 million damages award from Johnson & Johnson

191. See Elizabeth Weeks & Paula Sanford, Financial Impact of the Opioid Crisis on Local
Government: Qualifying Costs for Litigation and Policymaking, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1061, 1073–
74 (2019).
192. West Virginia Opioid Summary, supra note 147.
193. Terry & Hoss, supra note 34.
194. Martha Bebinger, Purdue Pharma Agrees to $270 Million Opioid Settlement with
Oklahoma, NPR (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/03/26/7068480
06/purdue-pharma-agrees-to-270-million-opioid-settlement-with-oklahoma.
195. Jackie Fortiér, Here’s What Happened to $829 Million Oklahoma Was Awarded to Treat
Opioid Addiction, KGOU (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.kgou.org/post/here-s-what-happened-829million-oklahoma-was-awarded-treat-opioid-addiction.
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(which was later reduced to $465 million due to the judge’s math error). 196 The
state of Oklahoma is presently entitled to receive $829 million from four
different settlements with opioid manufacturers. 197 So far, Oklahoma has spent
none of it on addiction treatment. 198 Despite this, Oklahoma’s Attorney General
has since initiated a pursuit against opioid distributors as well. 199
Local communities, on the other hand, have already implemented on-theground solutions to addressing the opioid epidemic.
B.

Evidence-Based Public Health Solutions Already Exist at the Local Level

In response to the opioid epidemic, local leaders throughout the U.S. have
already implemented effective solutions to fighting opioid addiction, overdose,
and death. 200 In 2018, the City of Chicago invested $225,000 in hiring and
training community members who experienced opioid addiction to serve as
“peer workers” and bring evidence-based treatment to the south and west
sides. 201 Chicago used an evidence-based research model that allowed these peer
workers to disseminate overdose prevention information, distribute naloxone (an
overdose reversal drug), and further connect members of the community with
resources for treatment. 202 As early as 2013, San Diego County created safe
opioid prescribing guidelines for physicians. 203 Boston has implemented drug
take-back kiosks for the confidential and free disposal of unused or expired
medications. 204 Moreover, Philadelphia launched its “Don’t Take the Risk”
campaign that discouraged people from taking opioids in the first place. 205 These
are just a few examples of local leaders taking initiative to combat the opioid
crisis.
The National Association of Counties and the National League of Cities
created an action plan calling for local leaders to lead the way in the fight against
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. See Nathaniel Weixel, Oklahoma Sues Three Major Opioid Distributors, HILL (Jan. 13,
2020), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/478067-oklahoma-sues-three-major-opioid-distribu
tors.
200. E.g., Combatting the Opioid Crisis, BIG CITIES HEALTH COALITION, https://www.big
citieshealth.org/combatting-opioids (last visited March 29, 2020).
201. Mayor Emanuel, Chicago Department of Public Health Increase Community Investment
to Fight Opioids, CHI. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/mayor/press_room/
press_releases/2018/February/FightingOpioids.html.
202. Id.
203. See generally PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE TASK FORCE, SAFE PAIN MEDICATION
PRESCRIBING GUIDELINES (2013).
204. Drug Take-Back Kiosks, CITY BOSTON, https://www.boston.gov/departments/recoveryservices/drug-take-back-kiosks (last visited Apr. 11, 2020).
205. Don’t Take the Risk, PHILA. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH, https://www.donttaketherisk.org/en
(last visited Apr. 11, 2020).
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the opioid crisis. 206 Specific actions included convening community leaders,
educating community members about the effects of the opioid crisis, expanding
treatment options, and fostering relationships with neighboring communities. 207
Moreover, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has
published a report outlining evidence-based strategies for preventing opioid
overdose as a resource for leaders who are spearheading the prevention of opioid
abuse in their own communities. 208 In that report, the CDC pointed to examples
of community trailblazers that successfully implemented various programs.209
The following discussion outlines some of those local initiatives that worked.
1. Medication-Assisted Treatment in Jails
Medication-assisted treatment (MAT) is repeatedly considered the “gold
standard” for individuals suffering from opioid use disorder. 210 The FDA has
approved three medications for use with MAT: methadone, buprenorphine, and
naltrexone. 211 Respectively, these medications are agonists, partial agonists, and
antagonists that drastically reduce the risk of withdrawal and overdose. 212
Methadone and buprenorphine prevent the agonizing withdrawal symptoms of
opioids “without causing euphoria,” while naltrexone entirely blocks the effects
of opioids. 213 Decades of research have supported the efficacy of methadone and
buprenorphine in preventing overdose. 214 Early research also supports the
effectiveness of naltrexone, though naltrexone may be less effective at treating
some patients than opioid agonists (i.e., methadone and buprenorphine). 215
One of the biggest problems facing MAT, however, is social stigma. Opioid
agonists are themselves opioids, and some fear that MAT is just “replacing one

206. See generally NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES & NAT’L ASS’N OF CTYS., supra note 188.
207. Id.
208. See generally JENNIFER J. CARROLL ET AL., CDC, EVIDENCE-BASED STRATEGIES FOR
PREVENTING OPIOID OVERDOSE: WHAT’S WORKING IN THE UNITED STATES (2018).
209. Id. at 9 passim.
210. E.g., ST. LOUIS CTY., ACTION PLAN: ADDRESSING OPIOID ADDICTION AND OVERDOSE
19 (2017).
211. Information about Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT), FDA (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/information-drug-class/information-about-medication-assisted-treat
ment-mat.
212. See Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT), SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH
SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-treatment (last visited Mar. 9,
2020). Methadone is a full agonist that prevents withdrawal, but it does not block the effects of
other narcotics (i.e., the feelings of euphoria) when administered. Buprenorphine is a partial agonist
that blocks the effects of other narcotics when administered while still reducing risk of withdrawal.
Naltrexone is an antagonist that blocks the effects of narcotics while also preventing withdrawal.
Id.
213. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 208, at 10.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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addiction with another.” 216 Admittedly, that fear is not entirely unfounded: It is
possible to overdose on methadone and other opioid agonists, and opioid
agonists can become addictive. 217 However, the research emphatically shows
that MAT is not a substitute to heroin or opioids. 218 In contrast to heroin, which
produces a “cycle of euphoria, crash, and craving,” methadone and
buprenorphine produce stable levels of opioids in the brain, resulting in patients
failing to experience a “rush” and significantly reducing their desire to take
opioids. 219 MAT accordingly allows individuals suffering from opioid
dependence to gradually wean off opioids and achieve long-term recovery.
The stigma of MAT decreases, however, as MAT programs are
implemented in communities by community leaders, and specifically, by local
law enforcement officials. Despite jail administrators and sheriffs historically
not providing treatment for substance use disorders, the National Sheriffs’
Association and the National Commission on Correctional Health Care have
encouraged jails to take the lead in implementing jail-based MAT and working
with community leaders to provide MAT upon release. 220 This is an enormous
step in decreasing stigma for MAT from the very group that gatekeeps the
detention of these individuals.
Jails 221 are perhaps one of the most important places to implement MAT.
“More than 10 million individuals pass through jails around the country
annually, with at least half of those individuals having substance use disorders,
half of whom are opioid abusers.” 222 Jails are uniquely positioned to not only
oversee individuals as they are suffering withdrawal, but also to initiate
treatment in a safe and controlled environment. 223

216. See NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ADDICTION TREATMENT: A
RESEARCH-BASED GUIDE 27 (3d ed. 2018). See also German Lopez, There’s a Highly Successful
Treatment for Opioid Addiction. But Stigma Is Holding It Back, VOX (Nov. 15, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/7/20/15937896/medication-assisted-treatmentmethadone-buprenorphine-naltrexone (discussing why MAT is not “just replacing one drug with
another.”); Information about Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT), supra note 211.
217. See WHO/UNODC/UNAIDS, SUBSTITUTION MAINTENANCE THERAPY IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF OPIOID DEPENDENCE AND HIV/AIDS PREVENTION 19 (2004).
218. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 216, at 27–28.
219. Id. at 27.
220. NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N & NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, JAIL-BASED
MEDICATION-ASSISTED TREATMENT: PROMISING PRACTICES, GUIDELINES, AND RESOURCES FOR
THE FIELD 2–3 (2018).
221. In contrast to prisons, which are operated by federal or state systems, jails are run by local
government agencies. See Terms & Definitions: State and Federal Prisoners and Prison Facilities,
OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tdtp&tid=13 (last visited March 30,
2020).
222. NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N & NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, supra note 220, at
2.
223. Id.
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While MAT is offered in few jails throughout the county, the impetus
appears to be growing. For example, at New York City’s jail, Rikers Island
Correctional Facility, treatment for opioid-dependent inmates includes both
methadone and buprenorphine. 224 In 2011, Washington County jail in Maryland
became the first jail to administer MAT for nonpregnant women and for men. 225
In 2016, Rhode Island, which operates a combined jail/prison, became the first
state to administer methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone to all inmates who
experience substance use disorders. 226 St. Louis County Jail in Missouri
followed suit in July 2019, initiating its three-phase MAT program that includes
the administration of methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone. 227
Additionally, Cuyahoga County in Ohio, one of the Track One bellwether
plaintiffs that settled in October 2019, outlined a $900,000 plan to implement a
MAT treatment program with methadone and buprenorphine in its jail. 228
MAT implementation in jails serves as a springboard for law enforcement
to treat opioid addiction as a public health issue rather than a criminal issue. For
example, when Cuyahoga County planned to allocate $900,000 to a MAT
treatment program in its jail, it also planned to allocate more than twice that
amount—$2.5 million—in a diversion program that kept low-level drug
offenders out of jail in the first place. 229
2. Targeted Naloxone Distribution
Another option is for counties and cities to distribute naloxone, an opioid
antagonist that acts as an immediate overdose reversal drug. 230 Naloxone
“carries no risk of abuse and has no effect on individuals who do not already
have opioids in their system,” it fosters no physical dependency, and it “produces
no neurological or psychological effects of euphoria.” 231 The CDC reports that
naloxone distribution is most effective when it is administered to those who are
at a high risk of experiencing or are in a position to react to overdose. 232
Naloxone is also particularly useful for rural communities, where those in the

6.

224. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 208, at 23.
225. NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N & NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, supra note 220, at

226. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 208, at 23.
227. See generally POLICY AND PROCEDURE NO. 1323: MEDICATION-ASSISTED TREATMENT
– BUPRENORPHINE/METHADONE DOSING, ST. LOUIS CTY. JUSTICE CTR. (2019), https://www.st
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cy1323.pdf.
228. Courtney Astolfi, Cuyahoga County Outlines Plan for $23M in Opioid Settlement Money,
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midst of an overdose may face longer wait times for Emergency Medical
Services (more commonly known as EMS). 233
A 2012 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) collected data
from 188 local opioid prevention programs that distributed naloxone from 1996
to 2010. 234 The MMWR revealed that after these programs distributed naloxone
to and trained 53,032 persons, the programs achieved 10,171 overdose
reversals. 235 Naloxone education and distribution thus materially helps to reduce
opioid overdose mortality. 236
3. Syringe Services Programs
Implementation of syringe services programs, sometimes known as “needle
exchange” programs, also serves as another option for local implementation.
When the Cabell-Huntington Health Department in West Virginia opened its
syringe service program, the program helped to reduce client needle-sharing
from above 25% to below 10% between September 2015 and March 2016
alone. 237 One Seattle study found that compared to those who did not use syringe
exchange programs, syringe services program participants were five times more
likely to initiate drug treatment and 3.5 times more likely to cease injection
altogether. 238 By 2014, syringe services programs operated in nearly 200 U.S.
cities. 239
4. Academic Detailing
Another compelling alternative is for community leaders to use the same
marketing tactics that pharmaceutical companies use to market their products,
but for evidence-based best practices for opioid prescribing. This is a tactic
known as “academic detailing.”
“Detailing” is “a structured educational strategy developed by commercial
manufacturers of medical and pharmaceutical technologies to market these
products to prescribers and pharmacists.” 240 “Academic detailing,” on the other
hand, “consists of structured visits to healthcare providers by trained
233. Howard K. Mell et al., Emergency Medical Services Response Times in Rural, Suburban,
and Urban Areas, 152 JAMA 983, 984 (2017). See generally Mark Faul et al., Disparity in
Naloxone Distribution Administration by Emergency Medical Service Providers and the Burden of
Drug Overdose in US Rural Communities, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e26, e26–e32 (Supp. 2015).
234. Eliza Wheeler et al., Community-Based Opioid Overdose Prevention Programs Providing
Naloxone – United States, 2010, 61 MMWR 101, 101 (2012).
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 208, at 26, 28.
238. See Holly Hagan et al., Reduced Injection Frequency and Increased Entry and Retention
in Drug Treatment Associated with Needle-Exchange Participation in Seattle Drug Injectors, 19 J.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 247, 249–50 (2000).
239. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 208, at 28.
240. Id. at 12.
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professionals who can provide tailored training and technical assistance, helping
healthcare providers use best practices.” 241 Commercial detailing overpowers
traditional academic information sources primarily because researchers and
others seeking to disseminate scientific medical knowledge are “rarely trained
in effective communication strategies.” 242 Academic detailing corrects the
communication disparity by “marketing” science to clinicians in a clear and
compelling manner. 243
Local leaders have achieved empirical success with academic detailing
efforts. When Staten Island launched a multifaceted public health strategy that
largely involved academic detailing in 2011, the borough saw a 29% decline in
opioid-related overdose deaths from 2011–2013, while the overdose death rate
remained unchanged in the four other New York City boroughs that lacked
academic detailing initiatives. 244 Two years later, in 2013, when New York City
carried out a two-month-long academic detailing program on Staten Island for
overdose prevention, the intervention resulted in a 12.4% decrease in high-dose
prescribing rates. 245 Moreover, after physicians in San Francisco received just a
half-hour-long academic detailing session for naloxone, their rate of naloxone
prescription increased eleven-fold. 246
Academic detailing serves as an option for both urban and rural areas. Since
2013, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene has
collaborated with the CDC to implement two academic detailing campaigns: one
to support buprenorphine-based MAT with providers, and one to offer training
and support to clinic staff to adopt safe opioid prescription practices. 247
Moreover, the San Francisco Department of Public Health sponsored
California’s statewide academic detailing intervention program study, which
supports rural counties for developing and implementing best practices for
prescription, overdose, and buprenorphine-based MAT. 248
Taken together, all of these local actions show that communities are highly
capable of implementing on-the-ground action in their localities.
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243. See Jerry Avorn, Academic Detailing: “Marketing” the Best Evidence to Clinicians, 317
JAMA 361, 361–62 (2017).
244. Denise Paone et al., Decrease in Rate of Opioid Analgesic Overdose Deaths – Staten
Island, New York City, 2011–2013, 64 MMWR 491, 491 (2015).
245. Jessica A. Kattan et al., Public Health Detailing—A Successful Strategy to Promote
Judicious Opioid Analgesic Prescribing, 106 AJPH 1430, 1430, 1435 (2016).
246. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 208, at 13. See also Emily Behar et al., Academic Detailing
Pilot for Naloxone Prescribing Among Primary Care Providers in San Francisco, 49 FAM. MED.
122, 125 (2017).
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C. The Spirit of the Opioid MDL Was to Include Counties and Cities, Not
States
It was by no accident that the opioid MDL amassed over 2,500 plaintiffs,
most of which were counties and cities across the U.S. This litigation strategy
appears to have been a deliberate effort to address the very spending shortfalls
associated with the attorney general plaintiffs of Big Tobacco litigation. As such,
counties and cities, rather than states, should be the parties responsible for
obtaining a global settlement and for spending the money as they see fit in their
communities.
This is not to say that counties and cities are immune to corrupt or otherwise
inappropriate spending of settlement proceeds. Precisely because of the known
spending shortfalls of the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, plaintiffs in
the opioid MDL have a responsibility not merely to achieve the largest possible
settlement for their clients, but rather to pave the way for effective use of
litigation proceeds. Any global opioid MDL settlement must be transparent,
there must be spending accountability, and the money must go toward legitimate
efforts aimed at abating the opioid epidemic.
Nonetheless, counties and cities have been the most directly impacted by
opioid addiction, withdrawal, and overdose, and they are best equipped to devise
on-the-ground solutions. Cities and counties deploy first responders to overdose.
Local hospitals and treatment facilities provide medical assistance to victims of
opioid dependence. When individuals die of overdose, they are viewed as lost
members of communities, not of states. Local law enforcement officials arrest
and prosecute those who distribute opioids, are opioid dependent, or both.
Settlement funds would thus best be served by directing proceeds directly to
counties and cities, many of which already have opioid programs in place, rather
than to the far-removed state level.
As Judge Polster reflected, the solution to addressing the opioid epidemic
“is not just moving money around, because this is an ongoing crisis.” 249
“Moving money around” would seem to be the precise outcome of an MDL
settlement if state attorneys general overthrow MDL settlement negotiations.
Early examples of this are West Virginia, which used opioid settlement funds to
remodel its states police academy, and Oklahoma, which still has yet to allocate
any of its $800 million in opioid settlement proceeds to any meaningful public
health action on opioids. This is juxtaposed against Cuyahoga County in Ohio,
which immediately had an allocation plan for a settlement the same month that
it settled the Track One case in October 2019. 250 Prioritizing county and city
plaintiffs during the opioid MDL does not mean eliminating states entirely from
the opioid conversation, but it does mean ensuring that counties and cities are
heard during negotiations and that they actually receive the money they deserve.
249. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 9:9-11.
250. Astolfi, supra note 228.
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Judge Polster further contemplated, “ideally, [solving the opioid epidemic]
should be handled by the legislative and executive branches, our federal
government, and our state governments.” 251 “The federal court is probably the
least likely branch of government to try and tackle this, but candidly, the other
branches of government, federal and state, have punted. So it’s here.” 252 Maybe
Judge Polster is right. Maybe this should have been handled by other branches
of government. However, where the other branches and the states failed to act,
either by legislation or by litigation, local governments stepped up to the plate.
It would be an insult to proactive counties and cities to usurp them of their
opportunity to achieve a global MDL settlement simply because state attorneys
general—who have already demonstrated they are incapable of appropriately
distributing such proceeds—commandeered the very litigation efforts that they
failed to initiate.
V. CONCLUSION
The lesson from Big Tobacco litigation is that procuring enormous
settlement awards, while imposing no spending accountability, is a sheer waste
of resources that insults the victims of a deadly public health crisis. Counties and
cities spearheaded the opioid MDL precisely to avoid the shortfalls of attorney
general plaintiffs involved in Big Tobacco litigation. For state attorneys general
to sabotage opioid MDL settlement negotiations at the eleventh hour would be
to effectively strip local governments of the opportunity to launch meaningful
solutions that would best suit their communities and save lives.
The opioid MDL is a truly unique opportunity to gather brilliant minds and
influential stakeholders in one place to create meaningful answers to this public
health crisis. We owe it to the local governments trying to solve the crisis—and
all those who have been affected by opioid addiction—to grant proceeds directly
to those parties capable of implementing on-the-ground solutions to the opioid
epidemic. Public health is a public responsibility. Aren’t local governments also
“the public”?
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